As unacceptable as they are stupid Archives - ... on a quiet day, I can hear her breathing

Spread the love

This work by Middle East Monitor is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

French President Emmanuel Macron at the Elysee Palace in Paris, France on October 13, 2026. [Mustafa Yalçın – Anadolu Agency]

Emmanuel Macron’s phrase landed like a cracked whip in the stale air of Western politics. “As unacceptable as they are stupid.” The target was not immigration policy, but a lie — the claim, amplified by Donald Trump and a chorus of right-wing figures, that Muslim migrants had set France alight. The protests that swept Paris, Lyon and Marseille were not a civilisational invasion.

They were a cry about grocery bills, overcrowded classrooms and a state that had cut 4,000 teaching posts while fuel prices climbed. Macron’s fury was therefore more than a defence of immigrants. It was a rejection of the most durable political technology of the age: the conversion of economic failure into cultural panic.

The mechanics are almost elegant in their cynicism. When wages stagnate, and public services buckle, the scapegoat is not the tax code or the corporate margin. It is the most visible minority. Trump told Macron to “close your borders and take control before it is too late”. The facts said otherwise.

More than half a million people marched — students, trade unionists, farmers — against the cost of living and the decay of public provision. The violence was real, but the culprits were not a religious category. They were a political economy that has spent four decades redistributing risk downward while protecting wealth upward.

The digital architecture of 2026 has made this old manoeuvre infinitely more potent. AI-generated images of an elderly couple “stripped and robbed,” of a Palestinian flag atop the Eiffel Tower, of “hordes” storming French streets, accumulated millions of views in hours. Macron named the mechanism precisely: foreign leaders, some mid-election campaign, “naively repeat AI-generated content or spread narratives that certain circles are clearly trying to promote”.

The grammar of the “Muslim threat” is centuries old; the delivery system is new. What once required a pamphlet or a tabloid now requires a prompt and an algorithm optimised for outrage.

READ: Macron says France to deploy forces to protect Saudi oil export port

Against this manufactured panic sits an empirical reality that is almost impolite to state.

The OECD finds that 77 per cent of immigrants across its member states are economically active, and that migration attenuates labour shortages in ageing societies.

Bruegel’s 2025 analysis is blunter still: with fertility rates unlikely to rebound, “continuingly high positive net-migration levels” are the only route to mitigate the economic effects of ageing, and inward migration can deliver a positive net contribution to public finances.

In Spain, the net annual fiscal contribution of the average immigrant has been estimated at some €1,600 more than the native-born, while costing the treasury 32 per cent less. The scapegoat, in other words, is subsidising the very state that is being told to fear him.

France’s security apparatus tells a more troubling story about how the panic is institutionalised. The FSPRT file — the register of suspected Islamist radicalisation — contained some 15,800 individuals as of late 2024. The database does not measure crime; it measures risk, and risk is a category that expands to fill the political demand for it. When a state can see a population through the lens of pre-emptive suspicion while remaining structurally blind to the socioeconomic composition of a protest, it has perfected a form of strategic unknowing.

The Muslim is legible as a suspect, illegible as a citizen with a grievance. That asymmetry is not a bug in the liberal state. It is a feature of how the liberal state has learned to govern insecurity.

This is where the global conversation must resist the imported script — and recognise that the script is no longer imported at all. It is written simultaneously in every major democracy.

In the United States, Gallup found in June 2026 that 73 per cent of Americans still see immigration as a good thing, and that the share wanting less immigration had fallen from a peak of 55 per cent in 2024 to 30 per cent — yet the political class continues to behave as if the opposite were true.

In Europe, the Transatlantic Trends survey records that 47 per cent of Europeans and 50 per cent of Americans see immigration as more of a problem than an opportunity, with the divide sharpest among those without a secondary education and those who have no personal contact with migrants. In Berlin, where 85 per cent of households rent, advertised rents have nearly doubled since 2014, and the far-right AfD has converted the housing crisis into an argument for restricting immigration, reaching around 17 per cent in city polling.

In Canada, Nanos Research found 52 per cent of respondents favour admitting fewer immigrants and temporary residents, with housing shortages, strained public services and the cost of living cited as the drivers — even as population growth slowed sharply. The proximate grievances are real and material: housing scarcity, wage stagnation, underfunded hospitals and schools.

But the moment those grievances are translated into a cultural threat narrative. These solutions might actually work — denser cities, a functioning care economy, a tax base that funds public infrastructure, sectoral bargaining that lifts wages — are displaced by a politics of exclusion that leaves the underlying failure untouched and the underlying distribution of power intact. The scapegoat is not a misunderstanding of the crisis. It is a substitute for solving it.

READ: France summons Iranian ambassador over alleged disinformation on student protests

The far-right playbook now travels with a translation layer. The Guardian documented nationalist parties from the National Rally to Vox to Chega seizing on the same European unrest, each converting a housing or cost-of-living protest into evidence of “anarchic immigration” or an “uncontrolled influx”. The script is modular. Only the cast changes.

Macron’s own record is compromised. His governments have passed anti-separatism laws that Muslim civil society experienced as a targeted gaze, and his defence of French Muslims against foreign slander sits awkwardly beside domestic policies that have often treated Islamic practice as a problem to be administered. That contradiction matters, because it reveals the deeper trap.

The liberal centre condemns the crudest scapegoating while maintaining a softer, more respectable version of the same logic: integration as cultural erasure, security as a permanent suspicion. The choice is not between Trump’s panic and Macron’s laïcité. It is between a politics that names the real sources of anger and one that keeps looking for a minority to absorb it.

The lesson is not that immigration is costless or that every grievance is economic. It is that the political economy of scapegoating is now more profitable than the political economy of repair. A party that blames a migrant for a hospital queue need not explain why the hospital was starved of capital. A leader who warns of an Islamist takeover need not account for the energy shock, the fiscal squeeze or the algorithmic amplification that turned a local protest into a civilisational melodrama.

The costs of that evasion are not borne by the scapegoater. They are borne by the Muslim family in a Paris banlieue, the asylum seeker in a Mediterranean detention centre, the working-class neighbourhood in Ohio or Saxony told that its neighbours are the cause of its decline. They are borne by every community invited to trade solidarity for suspicion, and by every democracy that discovers, too late, that the anger it mobilised cannot be contained by the institutions it hollowed out.

Macron’s word — stupid — was undiplomatic and precise. It named an intelligence failure disguised as a political strategy. The task for policymakers is to make that strategy expensive. That means provenance and transparency in digital information, so that fabricated images carry a cost. It means fiscal and industrial policy that makes migration’s contribution visible in the public ledger, not merely in think-tank working papers. It means a security architecture capable of distinguishing suspicion from citizenship.

And it means a political language that treats the cost-of-living crisis as a crisis of distribution, not of demography. The scapegoat is a substitute for argument. The only antidote is the argument itself — conducted with the courage to name who actually benefits when the crowd is pointed at the wrong gate.

OPINION: When diplomacy arrived in Jakarta and justice did not

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Donald Trump sings and dances, says that it's fun to kill everyone ... unless he gets distracted or falls asleep. — Donald Trump sings and dances, says that it’s fun to kill everyone … unless he gets distracted or falls asleep.

Orcas discuss rotting brain, front Orca says Sundown Syndrome is a dead givaway and he wishes someone would Lock Him Up

Tag: As unacceptable as they are stupid

Macron was right, and the scapegoats were chosen