Paul Rogers, University of Bradford

Much recent media focus has rightly been on the anniversary of the October 7 attacks, where Hamas assailants murdered nearly 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals and abducted a further 251.

Coverage has also centred on Israel’s expanding ground operation in Lebanon, which follows an intensive bombing campaign of the country’s south, east and capital, Beirut.

But meanwhile, the Israeli military has been continuing its operations in Gaza, where the death toll has risen to 42,000, according to the Hamas-run health ministry. Yet another instance of renewed Hamas paramilitary activity has emerged in Jabalia near Gaza City, an area that had reportedly been brought under the firm control of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

The Palestinian suffering has been massive and sustained, and Hamas has been severely damaged. But, in reality, the war in Gaza has become a violent stalemate with neither party able to win, yet neither likely to lose.

Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, though, is determined to press on in Gaza while extending the war to Lebanon.

Netanyahu’s main problem has been the depth of opposition facing him in Israel over the fate of the hostages. This was exemplified by a general strike in support of a hostage deal in early September and the sheer size of some of the demonstrations against his government in recent months.

However, that has changed with the start of Israel’s military actions in Lebanon, and has given Netanyahu breathing space. At the end of September, polling indicated that Netanyahu’s rightwing Likud party would now win more seats than any other if a general election was held.

That popularity may persist for now, depending partly on what the IDF does next. But the longer-term course of the war is probably contingent on the far-right components of Netanyahu’s governing coalition, and especially the rise of messianic Judaism.

Messianic Judaism is best seen as an amalgam of ultra-orthodox Judaism and religious nationalism. The movement, which has grown in Israel in recent years, seeks a pure Jewish state. This includes the rebuilding of the Temple of Solomon on the site of Islam’s third-most holy site, the Al-Aqsa Mosque, in the Old City of Jerusalem.

It has also become increasingly significant in the military. This is partly because many soldiers have been educated in religious military schools, and a high proportion of young army recruits come from religious families.

Indeed, some of the most active Israeli military units in the Gaza war are drawn specifically from such cohorts, an example being the Netzah Yehuda (Judah Forever) battalion.

Messianic Judaism is an element in Israeli politics that is underestimated in political analysis. This is despite the especially hard line it takes in terms of what is acceptable in ending the war, offering support to Netanyahu’s government on its own terms.

A state built out of conflict

In three distinct periods, the Israeli state has moved markedly to the right. The first followed the Yom Kippur war in 1973. The second occurred after the influx of hundreds of thousands of immigrants from the old Soviet bloc in the 1990s. And the third was a reaction to the second intifada (or uprising) in the early 2000s.

The latest move to the right was reflected by a growth in support for the Likud party, as well as smaller parties that were strongly Zionist and deeply opposed to any Palestinian influence on Israeli politics.

From 2010 onwards, there appeared to be a more stable period. The IDF maintained rigorous control over Gaza and the occupied West Bank, and there was a stalemate in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s rocket attacks into northern Israel were rare and Israeli troops stayed mainly south of the border.

However, the loss of life and the capture of hostages on October 7 was a massive and visceral shock. It was clear from the start that the government’s response would be overwhelming and focused on the destruction of Hamas.

A year later and that possibility seems diminished. But if there is ever to be a more peaceful coexistence between Israel and Palestine then the position of hardline Israelis has to be recognised, especially given their strong role in the current Netanyahu government.

To put it bluntly, in their view something has to be done about the Palestinians. As the Economist newspaper put it on August 29, the hardliners “want to annex the West Bank, topple the Palestinian Authority, permanently reoccupy and resettle Gaza, and push Palestinians abroad”.

They also want Israel to move away from secularism. According to the same article, Netanyahu’s aborted plan to curb judicial power in the early months of this government was only the first step to achieving this.

His government’s aim, the article argues, is to eradicate the secular “deep state” and seize control of the army, security agencies and courts. Their problem is that such an aim, if ever a possibility, is hugely constrained by the near-global perception of Israel as close to a rogue state.

What is already clear, though, is that Israeli society is becoming more hawkish. This is probably aided by substantial recent emigration, including a “brain drain” from the secular elite.

For now, the Netanyahu government may seem secure. But political stability is hard won and all too easily lost, especially at a time of accelerated war-making.

Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of Bradford

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.